1834 Andrew Jackson - Did Andrew Jackson want war with France?

It may seem a bit unbelievable, but in 1834 some in Congress and the Press thought President Andrew Jackson was on a march to war with France. Jackson was furious that France had time and time again failed to make good on paying for damages from the Napoleonic war in 1798. In his 1834 State of the Union Address, he urged Congress to take action that if France did not approve payment of the first installment of these damages in the next session, the United States should begin seizing property of French citizens. As you can imagine, the French were livid about this proposal, especially since in their mind, France was instrumental in helping America gain its freedom from the British.  Shown in the picture is an 1835 cartoon by James Akin depicting President Jackson challenging French King Louis Phillipe.  Jackson is being advised by King Neptune while French politicians are depicted as little frogs complaining about the Americans. 

During the Napoleonic wars, American merchants suffered greatly under a decree allowing for the capture and condemnation of neutral vessels carrying British products. As of 1798, the French had robbed around 300 ships, for which John Adams called an “unequivocal act of war on the commerce of the nations". It wasn't until 1831, that the US and France finally agreed to a treaty where France would make a lump sum payment of 25 million francs to cover all the damages. President Andrew Jackson initially declared it a victory, but after France failed to make the first installment and the French parliament made no attempts to appropriate funds for its payment, Jackson took it as a direct attack on our nation and an insult to his presidency. He interpreted it as a violation of a treaty and one of those very rare moments when Andrew Jackson and his bitter opponent Henry Clay were united in their reaction. France and wronged the United States and that France must make amends - or else.

When Jackson first got news that France failed to make the initial payment in 1832, he sent former secretary of state Edward Livingston to secure a "prompt and proper fulfillment" of the agreement. In a show of power, Livingston sailed to France aboard the 74-gun warship USS Delaware, yet the French Chambers continued to delay appropriating funds. When the French government refused to honor a draft drawn upon it by the Bank of the United States to cover the first installment, the bank socked the US government with a fifteen percent penalty, causing Jackson's anger to grow even greater. By 1834, Jackson was ready to act and suggested that Congress consider a plan put forth by Secretary of Treasury Louis McLane to confiscate French property to cover the missing payments. Such proposals led some of Jackson's opponents in Congress and the press, to claim that Jackson's advisers were leading the President on a path to war with France.  Jackson called these actions by the US Bank a needless distress n his State of the Union Address in 1834.

"To the needless distresses brought on the country during the last session of Congress has since been added the open seizure of the dividends on the public stock to the amount of $170,041, under pretense of paying damages, cost, and interest upon the protested French bill. This sum constituted a portion of the estimated revenues for the year 1834, upon which the appropriations made by Congress were based. It would as soon have been expected that our collectors would seize on the customs or the receivers of our land offices on the moneys arising from the sale of public lands under pretenses of claims against the United States as that the bank would have retained the dividends. Indeed, if the principle be established that any one who chooses to set up a claim against the United States may without authority of law seize on the public property or money wherever he can find it to pay such claim, there will remain no assurance that our revenue will reach the Treasury or that it will be applied after the appropriation to the purposes designated in the law."

Jackson's anger was boiling over that year, when he urged Congress in his State of the Union Address to consider whether “to adopt such provisional measures as it may deem necessary". Jackson promised that whatever provisions they pass would be “faithfully enforced by the Executive.” His words were quite measured, but stern. Jackson opened his address by defending the stance of the United States and his administration, stating that the whole course of his administration “has been characterized by a spirit so conciliatory and forbearing (patient)” that nobody could accuse the United States of being unjust or unfair. He pointed out that never once did France ever deny the claims of damage, yet after more than 25 years the two countries had failed to reach a settlement. In the interest of both nations, Jackson considered it one of his first duties to obtain from France a settlement of our claims, which he did in Paris on July 4, 1831. France agreed to pay 25 million francs for the damages along with interest minus 1.5 million francs to cover any reclamation by citizens of France. Jackson boasted that additionally the treaty reduced tariffs on French wine in return for lower tariffs on U.S. cotton. Unfortunately, despite doing everything necessary “to carry the treaty into full and fair effect”, the French government failed to make any legislative provisions to execute the treaty and thus no payments had been made. Time and time again, the French Chambers failed to take any action to make good on the treaty. Jackson shared a timeline of the events.

• March 21, 1832 - The French Chambers closed session without appropriating funds to cover the first installment owed to the United States.
• March 25, 1833 - The Chambers referred a bill to committee to make payments on the first installment, but no further action was taken
• June 26, 1833 - The French Chambers again closed with no action. A new bill was introduced, but no further action was taken
• April 1834 - Three years after the treaty was signed, a bill was voted on in the French Chambers and failed. 
• July 31, 1834 - The new Chambers met, but no attempt was made by the King or his cabinet to get an appropriation bill passed.

Jackson suggested that waiting for the French Chambers was a waste of time because he was convinced that the French government had no intentions of ever passing legislation to carry the treaty into effect. It was now time for Congress to act. Jackson was not looking to start a trade war with France. Congress had the power to increase duties or suspend trade, but Jackson suggested that such actions would also impact our own economy and would lead to further hostilities, obscuring the matter at hand. Jackson wanted swift action, but action that would make it very clear that it was a direct reaction to France’s failure to abide by the treaty. According to Jackson, “The question should be left, as it is now, in such an attitude that when France fulfills her treaty stipulations all controversy will be at an end”. Jackson wanted Congress to insist on a prompt execution of the treaty with a stern warning that any delay would require redress by the United States. By redress, Jackson was referring to the seizing of the property from French citizens. He defended this action based on the laws of nations which allow action to be taken when one nation refuses to make payments to another, including the seizure of property belonging to the citizens or subjects of that nation. Such action would not be considered an act of war. It was now up to Congress. Jackson wrote, “If an appropriation shall not be made by the French Chambers at their next session, it may justly be concluded that the Government of France has finally determined to disregard its own solemn undertaking and refuse to pay an acknowledged debt”. Such a case would be “a stain upon our national honor and a denial of justice to our injured citizens.” France had one more chance, if they did not appropriate funds Jackson wanted Congress to pass a bill “authorizing reprisals upon French property”. It was perhaps a game of chicken. Jackson suggested that France’s pride would never allow this to occur and if they did, and a “collision” between France and the United States were to occur, he was convinced that France was clearly in the wrong and the “responsibility for that result as well as every other will rest on her own head.” Jackson closed a promise that whatever “provisional measures" Congress deemed necessary he would "faithfully" enforce it. 

"It becomes my unpleasant duty to inform you that this pacific and highly gratifying picture of our foreign relations does not include those with France at this time. It is not possible that any Government and people could be more sincerely desirous of conciliating a just and friendly intercourse with another nation than are those of the United States with their ancient ally and friend. This disposition is founded as well on the most grateful and honorable recollections associated with our struggle for independence as upon a well grounded conviction that it is consonant with the true policy of both. The people of the United States could not, therefore, see without the deepest regret even a temporary interruption of the friendly relations between the two countries -- a regret which would, I am sure, be greatly aggravated if there should turn out to be any reasonable ground for attributing such a result to any act of omission or commission on our part. I derive, therefore, the highest satisfaction from being able to assure you that the whole course of this Government has been characterized by a spirit so conciliatory and forbearing [see APP Note] as to make it impossible that our justice and moderation should be questioned, what ever may be the consequences of a longer perseverance on the part of the French Government in her omission to satisfy the conceded claims of our citizens. 

The history of the accumulated and unprovoked aggressions upon our commerce committed by authority of the existing Governments of France between the years 1800 and 1817 has been rendered too painfully familiar to Americans to make its repetition either necessary or desirable. It will be sufficient here to remark that there has for many years been scarcely a single administration of the French Government by whom the justice and legality of the claims of our citizens to indemnity were not to a very considerable extent admitted, and yet near a quarter of a century has been wasted in ineffectual negotiations to secure it. 

Deeply sensible of the injurious effects resulting from this state of things upon the interests and character of both nations, I regarded it as among my first duties to cause one more effort to be made to satisfy France that a just and liberal settlement of our claims was as well due to her own honor as to their incontestable validity. The negotiation for this purpose was commenced with the late Government of France, and was prosecuted with such success as to leave no reasonable ground to doubt that a settlement of a character quite as liberal as that which was subsequently made would have been effected had not the revolution by which the negotiation was cut off taken place. The discussions were resumed with the present Government, and the result showed that we were not wrong in supposing that an event by which the two Governments were made to approach each other so much nearer in their political principles, and by which the motives for the most liberal and friendly intercourse were so greatly multiplied, could exercise no other than a salutary influence upon the negotiation.

After the most deliberate and thorough examination of the whole subject a treaty between the two Governments was concluded and signed at Paris on 1831-07-04, by which it was stipulated that "the French Government, in order to liberate itself from all the reclamations preferred against it by citizens of the United States for unlawful seizures, captures, sequestrations, confiscations, or destruction of their vessels, cargoes, or other property, engages to pay a sum of 25,000,000 francs to the United States, who shall distribute it among those entitled in the manner and according to the rules it shall determine" ; and it was also stipulated on the part of the French Government that this 25,000,000 francs should "be paid at Paris, in six annual installments of 4,166,666 francs and 66 centimes each, into the hands of such person or persons "as shall be authorized by the Government of the US to receive it" , the first installment to be paid "at the expiration of one year next following the exchange of the ratifications of this convention and the others at successive intervals of a year, one after another, 'til the whole shall be paid. To the amount of each of the said installments shall be added interest at 4% thereupon, as upon the other installments then remaining unpaid, the said interest to be computed from the day of the exchange of the present convention". 

It was also stipulated on the part of the United States, for the purpose of being completely liberated from all the reclamations presented by France on behalf of its citizens, that the sum of 1,500,000 francs should be paid to the Government of France in six annual installments, to be deducted out of the annual sums which France had agreed to pay, interest thereupon being in like manner computed from the day of the exchange of the ratifications. In addition to this stipulation, important advantages were secured to France by the following article, viz: 

The wines of France, from and after the exchange of the ratifications of the present conventions, shall be admitted to consumption in the States of the Union at duties which shall not exceed the following rates by the gallon (such as it is used at present for wines in the US), to wit: 6 cents for red wines in casks; 10 cents for white wines in casks, and 22 cents for wines of all sorts in bottles. The proportions existing between the duties on French wines thus reduced and the general rates of the tariff which went into operation 1829-01-01, shall be maintained in case the Government of the United States should think proper to diminish those general rates in a new tariff.

In consideration of this stipulation, which shall be binding on the United States for 10 years, the French Government abandons the reclamations which it had formed in relation to the 8th article of the treaty of cession of Louisiana. It engages, moreover, to establish on the long-staple cottons of the United States which after the exchange of the ratifications of the present convention shall be brought directly thence to France by the vessels of the US or by French vessels the same duties as on short-staple cotton.

This treaty was duly ratified in the manner prescribed by the constitutions of both countries, and the ratification was exchanged at the city of Washington on 1832-02-02. On account of its commercial stipulations it was in five days thereafter laid before the Congress of the United States, which proceeded to enact such laws favorable to the commerce of France as were necessary to carry it into full execution, and France has from that period to the present been in the unrestricted enjoyment of the valuable privileges that were thus secured to her. 

The faith of the French nation having been thus solemnly pledged through its constitutional organ for the liquidation and ultimate payment of the long deferred claims of our citizens, as also for the adjustment of other points of great and reciprocal benefits to both countries, and the United States having, with a fidelity and promptitude by which their conduct will, I trust, be always characterized, done every thing that was necessary to carry the treaty into full and fair effect on their part, counted with the most perfect confidence on equal fidelity and promptitude on the part of the French Government. In this reasonable expectation we have been, I regret to inform you, wholly disappointed. No legislative provision has been made by France for the execution of the treaty, either as it respects the indemnity to be paid or the commercial benefits to be secured to the United States, and the relations between the United States and that power in consequence thereof are placed in a situation threatening to interrupt the good understanding which has so long and so happily existed between the two nations. 

Not only has the French Government been thus wanting in the performance of the stipulations it has so solemnly entered into with the United States, but its omissions have been marked by circumstances which would seem to leave us without satisfactory evidences that such performance will certainly take place at a future period. Advice of the exchange of ratifications reached Paris prior to 1832-04-08. The French Chambers were then sitting, and continued in session until 1832-04-21, and although one installment of the indemnity was payable on 1833-02-02, one year after the exchange of ratifications, no application was made to the Chambers for the required appropriation, and in consequence of no appropriation having then been made the draft of the United States Government for that installment was dishonored by the minister of finance, and the United States thereby involved in much controversy. 

The next session of the Chambers commenced on 1832-11-19, and continued until 1833-04-25. Not withstanding the omission to pay the first installment had been made the subject of earnest remonstrance on our part, the treaty with the United States and a bill making the necessary appropriations to execute it were not laid before the Chamber of Deputies until 1833-04-06, nearly five months after its meeting, and only nineteen days before the close of the session. The bill was read and referred to a committee, but there was no further action upon it. 

The next session of the Chambers commenced on 1833-04-26, and continued until 1833-06-26. A new bill was introduced on 1833-06-11, but nothing important was done in relation to it during the session. 

In 1834 April, nearly three years after the signature of the treaty, the final action of the French Chambers upon the bill to carry the treaty into effect was obtained, and resulted in a refusal of the necessary appropriations. The avowed grounds upon which the bill was rejected are to be found in the published debates of that body, and no observations of mine can be necessary to satisfy Congress of their utter insufficiency. Although the gross amount of the claims of our citizens is probably greater than will be ultimately allowed by the commissioners, sufficient is, never the less, shown to render it absolutely certain that the indemnity falls far short of the actual amount of our just claims, independently of the question of damages and interest for the detention. That the settlement involved a sacrifice in this respect was well known at the time -- a sacrifice which was cheerfully acquiesced in by the different branches of the Federal Government, whose action upon the treaty was required from a sincere desire to avoid further collision upon this old and disturbing subject and in the confident expectation that the general relations between the two countries would be improved thereby. 

The refusal to vote the appropriation, the news of which was received from our minister in Paris about 1834-05-15, might have been considered the final determination of the French Government not to execute the stipulations of the treaty, and would have justified an immediate communication of the facts to Congress, with a recommendation of such ultimate measures as the interest and honor of the United States might seem to require. But with the news of the refusal of the Chambers to make the appropriation were conveyed the regrets of the King and a declaration that a national vessel should be forthwith sent out with instructions to the French minister to give the most ample explanations of the past and the strongest assurances for the future. After a long passage the promised dispatch vessel arrived. 

The pledges given by the French minister upon receipt of his instructions were that as soon after the election of the new members as the charter would permit the legislative Chambers of France should be called together and the proposition for an appropriation laid before them; that all the constitutional powers of the King and his cabinet should be exerted to accomplish the object, and that the result should be made known early enough to be communicated to Congress at the commencement of the present session. Relying upon these pledges, and not doubting that the acknowledged justice of our claims, the promised exertions of the King and his cabinet, and, above all, that sacred regard for the national faith and honor for which the French character has been so distinguished would secure an early execution of the treaty in all its parts, I did not deem it necessary to call the attention of Congress to the subject at the last session.

I regret to say that the pledges made through the minister of France have not been redeemed. The new Chambers met on 1834-07-31, and although the subject of fulfilling treaties was alluded to in the speech from the throne, no attempt was made by the King or his cabinet to procure an appropriation to carry it into execution. The reasons given for this omission, although they might be considered sufficient in an ordinary case, are not consistent with the expectations founded upon the assurances given here, for there is no constitutional obstacle to entering into legislative business at the first meeting of the Chambers. This point, however, might have been over-looked had not the Chambers, instead of being called to meet at so early a day that the result of their deliberations might be communicated to me before the meeting of Congress, been prorogued to 1834-12-29 -- a period so late that their decision can scarcely be made known to the present Congress prior to its dissolution. To avoid this delay our minister in Paris, in virtue of the assurance given by the French minister in the United States, strongly urged the convocation of the Chambers at an earlier day, but without success. It is proper to remark, however, that this refusal has been accompanied with the most positive assurances on the part of the executive government of France of their intention to press the appropriation at the ensuing session of the Chambers. 

The executive branch of this Government has, as matters stand, exhausted all the authority upon the subject with which it is invested and which it had any reason to believe could be beneficially employed. 

The idea of acquiescing in the refusal to execute the treaty will not, I am confident, be for a moment entertained by any branch of this Government, and further negotiation upon the subject is equally out of the question. 

If it shall be the pleasure of Congress to await the further action of the French Chambers, no further consideration of the subject will at this session probably be required at your hands. But if from the original delay in asking for an appropriation, from the refusal of the Chambers to grant it when asked, from the omission to bring the subject before the Chambers at their last session, from the fact that, including that session, there have been five different occasions when the appropriation might have been made, and from the delay in convoking the Chambers until some weeks after the meeting of Congress, when it was well known that a communication of the whole subject to Congress at the last session was prevented by assurances that it should be disposed of before its present meeting, you should feel yourselves constrained to doubt whether it be the intention of the French Government, in all its branches, to carry the treaty into effect, and think that such measures as the occasion may be deemed to call for should be now adopted, the important question arises what those measures shall be. 

Our institutions are essentially pacific. Peace and friendly intercourse with all nations are as much the desire of our Government as they are the interest of our people. But these objects are not to be permanently secured by surrendering the rights of our citizens or permitting solemn treaties for their indemnity, in cases of flagrant wrong, to be abrogated or set aside. 

It is undoubtedly in the power of Congress seriously to affect the agricultural and manufacturing interests of France by the passage of laws relating to her trade with the United States. Her products, manufactures, and tonnage may be subjected to heavy duties in our ports, or all commercial intercourse with her may be suspended. But there are powerful and to my mind conclusive objections to this mode of proceeding.

We can not embarrass or cut off the trade of France without at the same time in some degree embarrassing or cutting off our own trade. The injury of such a warfare must fall, though unequally, upon our own citizens, and could not but impair the means of the Government and weaken that united sentiment in support of the rights and honor of the nation which must now pervade every bosom. Nor is it impossible that such a course of legislation would introduce once more into our national councils those disturbing questions in relation to the tariff of duties which have been so recently put to rest. Besides, by every measure adopted by the Government of the United Sstates with the view of injuring France the clear perception of right which will induce our own people and the rulers and people of all other nations, even of France herself, to pronounce our quarrel just will be obscured and the support rendered to us in a final resort to more decisive measures will be more limited and equivocal. 

There is but one point of controversy, and upon that the whole civilized world must pronounce France to be in the wrong. We insist that she shall pay us a sum of money which she has acknowledged to be due, and of the justice of this demand there can be but one opinion among mankind. True policy would seem to dictate that the question at issue should be kept thus disencumbered and that not the slightest pretense should be given to France to persist in her refusal to make payment by any act on our part affecting the interests of her people. The question should be left, as it is now, in such an attitude that when France fulfills her treaty stipulations all controversy will be at an end.

It is my conviction that the United States ought to insist on a prompt execution of the treaty, and in case it be refused or longer delayed take redress into their own hands. After the delay on the part of France of a quarter of a century in acknowledging these claims by treaty, it is not to be tolerated that another quarter of a century is to be wasted in negotiating about the payment. The laws of nations provide a remedy for such occasions. It is a well-settled principle of the international code that where one nation owes another a liquidated debt which it refuses or neglects to pay the aggrieved party may seize on the property belonging to the other, its citizens or subjects, sufficient to pay the debt without giving just cause of war. This remedy has been repeatedly resorted to, and recently by France herself toward Portugal, under circumstances less unquestionable. 

The time at which resort should be had to this or any other mode of redress is a point to be decided by Congress. If an appropriation shall not be made by the French Chambers at their next session, it may justly be concluded that the Government of France has finally determined to disregard its own solemn undertaking and refuse to pay an acknowledged debt. In that event every day's delay on our part will be a stain upon our national honor, as well as a denial of justice to our injured citizens. Prompt measures, when the refusal of France shall be complete, will not only be most honorable and just, but will have the best effect upon our national character. 

Since France, in violation of the pledges given through her minister here, has delayed her final action so long that her decision will not probably be known in time to be communicated to this Congress, I recommend that a law be passed authorizing reprisals upon French property in case provision shall not be made for the payment of the debt at the approaching session of the French Chambers. Her pride and power are too well known to expect any thing from her fears and preclude the necessity of a declaration that nothing partaking of the character of intimidation is intended by us. She ought to look upon it as the evidence only of an inflexible determination on the part of the United States to insist on their rights. 

That Government, by doing only what it has itself acknowledged to be just, will be able to spare the United States the necessity of taking redress into their own hands and save the property of French citizens from that seizure and sequestration which American citizens so long endured without retaliation or redress. If she should continue to refuse that act of acknowledged justice and, in violation of the law of nations, make reprisals on our part the occasion of hostilities against the United States, she would but add violence to injustice, and could not fail to expose herself to the just censure of civilized nations and to the retributive judgments of Heaven. 

Collision with France is the more to be regretted on account of the position she occupies in Europe in relation to liberal institutions, but in maintaining our national rights and honor all governments are alike to us. If by a collision with France in a case where she is clearly in the wrong the march of liberal principles shall be impeded, the responsibility for that result as well as every other will rest on her own head. 

Having submitted these considerations, it belongs to Congress to decide whether after what has taken place it will still await the further action of the French Chambers or now adopt such provisional measures as it may deem necessary and best adapted to protect the rights and maintain the honor of the country. What ever that decision may be, it will be faithfully enforced by the Executive as far as he is authorized so to do.

The press at that time reacted to Jackson's message mostly along party lines. Many Whig papers branded the message a menace to France while Democratic papers denounced the Whigs as traitors. Public resentment in France was building as the French saw this as American ingratitude despite all of France's sacrifices to support the American revolution. Diplomatic relations became severed and tensions mounted.  Wanting to avoid a military struggle with the US who now had a larger war fleet that France, the French chamber finally voted to pass the appropriations but with an amendment to demand that President Jackson provide an explanation of his remarks. Jackson refused to apologize, and the British had to step in and reconcile the differences. The indemnity was finally paid. 

References

Presidency.ucsb.edu. 2020. Sixth Annual Message | The American Presidency Project. [online] Available at: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/sixth-annual-message-2> [Accessed 13 April 2020].

France-Amérique. 2020. The Quasi-War Between France And The United States. [online] Available at: <https://france-amerique.com/en/la-quasi-guerre-entre-la-france-et-les-etats-unis/> [Accessed 13 April 2020].

Meacham, J., 2009. American Lion. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, pp.283-285.

Thomas, R., 1976. Andrew Jackson Versus France American Policy toward France, 1834-36. Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 35(1), pp.51-64.

Wagner, D., 2020. 1823 James Monroe - Just Indemnity From The French Government. [online] Stateoftheunionhistory.com. Available at: <http://www.stateoftheunionhistory.com/2017/08/1823-james-monroe-just-indemnity-from.html> [Accessed 13 April 2020].