In 1823, the United States declared that it would remain neutral in the affairs and politics of Europe, and expected the Allied powers of Europe to do the same. President Monroe and his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams rebuked Great Britain and refused to accept an Anglo-American policy towards South America. It seems to be Russia who reminded Secretary Adams of America's promise to remain neutral that tipped the balance against Great Britain. Yet, the United States would stand alone, siding neither with Great Britain, nor the Holy Alliance.
John Quincy Adams had a young start in politics. At the age of 26, President Washington appointed him ambassador to the Netherlands, and then Minister to Portugal 3 years later. When his father became President, John Quincy Adams was appointed the minister to Prussia, and in 1809 President Madison appointed him to be the first ever U.S. Ambassador to Russia. By the end of the War of 1812, John Quincy Adams was appointed as Minister to Great Britain and became the leading American negotiator in the Treaty of Ghent. By 1817, John Quincy Adams had traveled to great lengths and knew well and was well known to many foreign leaders, so it was only fitting that he would be named Secretary of State under President James Monroe. Adams served in this capacity for 8 years and had many more accomplishments including the Treaty of 1818 with the United Kingdom to resolve boundary issues between British Canada and the United States. In 1819, Adams negotiated a treaty with Luis De Onis where Spain ceded the Florida territory in exchange for the United States assuming $5 million liability claims of American citizens against Spain. Probably, the most impactful and lasting foreign policy by John Quincy Adams was the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.
The Monroe Doctrine, as delivered in President Monroe's 1823 State of the Union, declared that any attempts by European nations to colonize or interfere with the independent nations of South America would be viewed as an act of aggression on the United States itself. This doctrine was not only a defining moment in the Monroe presidency, but also in U.S. foreign policy for many years to come. President Monroe seriously considered partnering with Great Britain on a policy towards the independence of South America in an attempt to separate Britain from allied powers of Europe known as the quintuple Alliance. The Quintuple alliance was formed when France joined the allied powers of Russia, Austria, Prussia and the United Kingdom. The alliance was an expansion of the Holy Alliance formed in 1815 by the great Christian monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia. The mission of the alliance was to affirm the divine rights of kings and Christian values in Europe. Their immediate goal was to retrain the liberal revolutions spreading in the wake of the French Revolutionary Wars.
Perhaps, Great Britain's number one priority in protecting the colonies from Spain's interference was to protect their trade along the coast of South America. As early as November, 1822 Prime Minister George Canning had given thought to recognizing the sovereignty of these republics of South America. And, in December of the following year, Canning then announced his intentions of sending consuls to the Spanish Colonies to protect British Trade. Because of the French invasion into Spain, this received very little attention at the Congress of Verona in 1823. In addition, the French invasion of Spain led to fears that the old colonial system might be restored and the Britain's position of influence among the allied powers of Europe would be eclipsed by France, threatening her commerce in South America. These events led Great Britain and the leading minds of the British Cabinet to seek out an agreement with the United States to recognized the independent nations of South America. To win over the United States, Canning appealed to the sympathy of the American citizens towards the independence movement in Latin America. If Canning could capitalize on the political liberalism of the United States, he could gain support for Great Britain's commercial interests in the southern half of the western hemisphere. Author Leonard Axel Lawson recorded an excerpt from Canning's letter to Richard Rush, the U.S. minister in August of 1823. Canning asked "if the moment has not arrived when our two governments might understand each other as to the Spanish-American Colonies; and if so, whether it would not be expedient for ourselves, and beneficial for all the world, that our principles in regard to them should be clearly settled and avowed." Richard Rush replied to Canning's request, agreeing on the independence of the South American colonies and, suggested that if England were ready to acknowledge the independence of the new states, the United States would take quick action and facilitate negotiations with Great Britain. Yet, Canning was not ready to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Colonies of South America. As Rush had stated in his responses to Canning, the whole matter should be satisfactorily concluded if only Great Britain would recognize the independence of these Latin American states. Canning again refused, suggesting that the states did not yet have the the internal stability that would warrant the recognition of Grate Britain. Furthermore, Canning suggested that doing so might cause his country some embarrassment among the allied powers of Europe. The most Great Britain could offer was a promise to recognize the states sometime in the future. Failing to find common ground with the United States, Canning now turned to France, the same country that it feared would eclipse it's influence among the allied powers.
On October 10th, Minister Rush reported the sudden termination of Canning's interest in an Anglo-American agreement towards South America to Secretary of State Adams. This was just days before President Monroe was to deliver his Monroe Doctrine. One of the major fears, in 1823 was the possibility that Canning might offer Cuba to to France as spoils of war, in order to establish or firm up a mutual policy towards Latin America. It was now up to the Monroe administration to decide whether or not to continue pursuing an Anglo-American policy towards the South American States. On October 17th, Monroe reached out to former President Thomas Jefferson. In the letter he shared dispatches received from Mr. Rush suggesting that the holy alliance was suggesting a cooperation between Great Britain and the united States. Monroe had three questions for Jefferson.
"1 Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, and wars, on the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert by agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result? 2* If a case can exist, in which a sound maxim may, and ought to be departed from, is not the present instance, precisely that case? 3* Has not the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U States, and in consequence, either in favor of Despotism or of liberty and may it not be presum'd, that aware of that necessity, her government, has seiz'd on the present occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce and mark the commenc'ment of that career."
Monroe, shared his impression that we should accept the proposal from Canning, but also make it known "that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves". Jefferson and Madison, both were in favor of accepting Canning's proposal because it would separate Great Britain from the Holy Alliance. But just one day before Monroe reached out to Jefferson and Monroe, Russia interjected themselves into the question on South America The Russian Minister Baron de Tuyll called on Secretary Adams and informed him that the Emperor of Russia would not receive any minister from any of the new states in South America. He also expressed the Emperor's expectation that the United States would remain neutral in towards the European powers while recognizing the independence of the South American States.
Finally, on December 2 of 1823, President Monroe delivered his Monroe Doctrine in his State of the Union Address. The words were penned by his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams and reiterated that the United States policy towards Europe would "nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers". The United States would not partner with Great Britain, nor would it stand by and allow any of the allied powers to interfere with Spain's relations to the colonies of South America. America was telling France, Great Britain and the Holy Alliance to stay out. There was no need for any interference. Given the strength and resources of the new nations, and the distance from Spain, it was quite "obvious that she can never subdue them". The United States would maintain it's neutrality, "in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."
Here is the part two of the Monroe Doctrine from the 1823 State of the Union Address.
"The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States.
Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none.
But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."
For more on part one, please see The Monroe Doctrine towards Latin America
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29465
The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, Volume 103, Issue 1, Leonard Axel Lawson, Columbia University (1922) pg 104 -122
John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine by Ford, Worthington Chauncey, The America Historical Review (1902)
https://learnodo-newtonic.com/john-quincy-adams-accomplishments
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quintuple_Alliance
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holy_Alliance
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_Verona
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/Monroe_doctrine.jpg
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