Russia in 1812 was both a political Ally of England and a commercial friend of the United States. Fearing that the US would form an alliance with France against Great Britain, Czar Alexander I of Russia was eager to end the war by bringing the two parties together to settle their differences. On September 21, 1812, Alexander had the Chancellor Romanzoff approach the American minister John Quincy Adams on the matter and at the same time sent instructions to the Russian diplomatic agent in the United States. Several months later, President Madison accepted the offer and on March 11, formal action was taken to send three commissioners to Russia to meet with the British plenipotentiaries. Meanwhile the British were very cautious stating that the Americans declared war on Great Britain largely at the instigation of France. So the Chancellor Romanzoff called on Adams to discuss the Franco-American situation. Mr. Adams assured the Chancellor that there was no collision or understanding of the two countries and that America had not intention on drawing any closer to France. This was communicated to the English government, but they remained firm in their opinion that the United States was dependent upon France. They argued that the declaration of war was proof enough of this. It was clear that Great Britain was not going to come to the Russian table for mediation, yet the Chancellor proceeded.
On July 21, Albert Gallatin and Bayard arrived in St. Petersburg and called on the Chancellor three days later. (Albert Gallatin was the Secretary of Treasury, but in 1813 began a long career as a diplomat). Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary of England, Castlereagh made arrangements to establish negotiations in London. Castlereah even promised to nominate plenipotentiaries to bring the American envoys to Europe. A political rivalry between Romanzoff and Castlereagh was brewing as each man and their respective countries were trying to win a diplomatic victory. As things deteriorated, a Lord Walpole, a representative from Great Britain arrived in St. Petersburg and began a campaign of slander against the Chancellor in order to discredit him with the Americans. Walpole, further accused the Chancellor of standing in the way of peace, and accused the Russian Emperor as refusing to no longer act as a mediator. Bayard and Gallatin called on the Emperor to ask why, but Alexander was in turn hurt by what he viewed as lack of respect and trust. Alexander never responded to Bayard and Gallatin, and they left the country. The attempt at diplomacy was a complete failure.
In 1813, President James Madison opened his State of the Union with the lack of any good news from this negotiation. Madison had high hopes that the mission would have a favorable result and restore peace. He believed that the British plenipotentiaries would do everything in their power to stop the "effusion of blood". Unfortunately as Madison explained, the British cabinet either mistook America's desire for peace or were misled by "fallacious calculations". Madison had not received any communications from Gallatin and Bayard, but he did have knowledge that the mediation was declined in the "1st instance". Furthermore, there was no evidence or expectation that the disposition of the British council would change. Therefore, America could not stand down, "Under such circumstances a nation proud of its rights and conscious of its strength has no choice but an exertion of the 1 in support of the other." Based on this strong language, it seems that Madison either had no knowledge of the Chancellor's failure at diplomacy, or he chose to ignore it and blame the British.
Here are the first three opening paragraphs of Madison's State of the Union Address:
"In meeting you at the present interesting conjuncture it would have been highly satisfactory if I could have communicated a favorable result to the mission charged with negotiations for restoring peace. It was a just expectation, from the respect due to the distinguished Sovereign who had invited them by his offer of mediation, from the readiness with which the invitation was accepted on the part of the United States, and from the pledge to be found in an act of their Legislature for the liberality which their plenipotentiaries would carry into the negotiations, that no time would be lost by the British Government in embracing the experiment for hastening a stop to the effusion of blood. A prompt and cordial acceptance of the mediation on that side was the less to be doubted, as it was of a nature not to submit rights or pretensions on either side to the decision of an umpire, but to afford merely an opportunity, honorable and desirable to both, for discussing and, if possible, adjusting them for the interest of both.http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29455
The British cabinet, either mistaking our desire of peace for a dread of British power or misled by other fallacious calculations, has disappointed this reasonable anticipation. No communications from our envoys having reached us, no information on the subject has been received from that source; but it is known that the mediation was declined in the 1st instance, and there is no evidence, notwithstanding the lapse of time, that a change of disposition in the British councils has taken place or is to be expected.
Under such circumstances a nation proud of its rights and conscious of its strength has no choice but an exertion of the 1 in support of the other."
The Russian Offer of Mediation in the War of 1812, by F.A. Golder Political Science Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sept. 1916) pp. 380-390 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2141651?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)
http://www.pbs.org/wned/war-of-1812/essays/treaty-ghent/
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